This study analyses the institutional reforms that took place inside the Brazilian Ministry of Defense between 2007 and 2011. By stressing the strategic interaction between civilian and military members, we shed light on recent advances in institutionalizing civilian control. More precisely, measures such as creating a joint staff of the armed forces, changing the rules on military budget proposal and on promotion of military officers, connecting ministerial secretaries and helping to consolidate a civilian staff at the Ministry of Defense. These initiatives have reversed a historical pattern. That is, a high degree of autonomy of each service branch' commanders vis-à-vis the Minister. As a conclusion, we say that the adoption of monitoring and intrusive mechanisms reveals the logic of delegation and division of labor, thus indicating a higher degree of professionalization among the Brazilian armed forces. Key-words: Ministry of Defense, civilian control, delegation, democracy.
INTRODUCTION
One of the key issues addressed by contemporary literature on civil-military relations is the interaction between civilian authorities, military members and society in a democratic regime. Also, a central theme has been the one of how much political influence military members enjoy in contemporary democracies. Stepan (1988) has emphasized that Latin American militaries in general maintained control during the democratization process and gained political advantage from the newly formed democratic forces, which allowed them to insulate themselves from civilian control. The author recognizes these prerogatives as a latent example of independent structural power within the polity that could vary from a low, moderate or high presence 3 . In this sense, Zaverucha (1994; 2005) classifies Brazil after 1988 as a semi-democracy entailing a friendly military tutelage. Although they do not aim to be at the Executive Power, the military continue to enjoy veto powers in moments of political By contrast Hunter (1997a; 1997b) says that, although the initial conditions favored the continuity of certain institutional privileges of the armed forces, electoral competition in post-authoritarian Brazil led civilians to contest the military and effectively reduce military capacity to interfere in the political agenda in the medium and long terms, therefore altering the conservative pact that prevailed during transition. Oliveira (1994, p. 249 ) identifies a crisis of identity among armed forces members since 1988 and the end of the Cold War. This crisis starts with the beginning of re-democratization during Geisel's term (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) and increases during Collor's government (1990) (1991) (1992) , signalizing an increasingly less powerful and influential military. These explanations, far from being incompatible, shed light on different aspects of contemporary relations in re-democratized countries during the last decades. Fitch has considered there to be three basic patterns of civil-military relations that should be attended in democracies ( 1998, p.37-38) . First, military members are politically subordinated to the democratic regime, meaning that the notion of "national guardians of the nation" (LOVEMAN, 1999) is inconsistent with democratic values. The armed forces do not act as moderators of political activity in order to preserve the status quo. But they can be politically subordinated and still have their own corporative interests. Secondly, there is policy control over the armed forces via constitutionally elected civilian authorities, which means that missions and budgetary resources should not be considered exclusive areas of military domain. These assignments should be made by the competent civilian authority and military forces will have autonomy for deciding just when explicitly delegated. Lastly, military members act according to the law, thus they should not violate the rights of other groups or individuals. Even though they can be subjected to special legal norms, the armed forces are not conceded legal privileges by law or by legislative practices.
The existing situation does not permit us to posit that Brazil has reached a consolidated democratic control 5 , since constitutional military prerogatives and the informal power enjoyed by military forces are still important, despite the fact that this is declining (ARTURI, 2011, p. 168) . 6 But on a day-to-day level, we take as an assumption that disputes between civilian authorities and military forces happen within democratic channels, even in situations where military interests are negatively affected. That is why a theoretical framework that emphasizes such strategic interaction can be helpful in understanding recent advances on institutionalizing civilian control over the armed forces.
The assumption introduced by Huntington (1957) that objective civilian control would maximize military professionalism and at the same time ensure their subordination to civilian authorities is a concept which has been quite contested. For Huntington, a professional military would be by definition politically neutral and should have autonomy on corporative issues, while the most critical ones related to domestic and foreign policy would be of civilian competency (1957, p. 80-84) . By "militarizing the military" and allowing the armed forces to act more freely within their own professional domain, Huntington insists, it would be possible to have a subordinated and efficient military establishment.
Different analyses have shown that, in Latin American, higher levels of professionalization have, in fact, coincided with increased political activity among military officers (FITCH, 1998; LOVEMAN, 1999) . During the decades of 1920 and 1930, several foreign missions from Germany, Italy and Spain came to the region to provide armed forces with professional training. These missions also provided the rationale of moral superiority that made military officers to see civilian authorities as rather handicapped in solving national problems. In the following decades, such rhetoric would lead the armed forces to assume leadership and dominate internal administration (LOVEMAN 1999, p. 65-70) .
After the third wave of democratization, the military retreated from national politics in most countries in the region, which went alongside the elite's desire (that had previously supported the regime) to distance themselves from this past. In many countries, the armed forces faced a crisis of legitimacy that was followed by cuts on the budget and size of the troops. Additionally, the widespread concern for keeping the armed forces restricted to their own professional sphere revived the worry for professionalization. . We will analyze a positive case, the Ministry of Defense, which is a central institution for emulating civilian hierarchy inside defense institutions.
THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT FRAMEWORK
Feaver (2003) On the other hand, military agents also have different kinds of preferences that can fit into three specific sets: policy outcomes, how their behavior is interpreted and how the relationship is monitored (FEAVER, 2003, p. 63-64) . Military agents have military policy preferences, such as preferring to deal with offensive or even preventive operations that enable them to be in a position of advantage, where the scope of the conflict can be controlled.
Also Peter Feaver identifies a general military preference for honor and respect that may give an incentive for military members to obey civilian orders. In this sense, studies on police officers have previously stated that organizational culture has an overwhelming importance in determining higher degrees of compliance among the subordinates (BREHM; GATES, 1993). Since not following civilian command is seen as dishonorable in a democracy, military members may choose to act accordingly because it is the "right thing to do". Lastly, a minimum degree of civilian intrusion and supervision will always be preferred by the military. This is according to the traditional organization theory, that says that an agent always values autonomy, meaning "the ability to decide what to do" and "the ability to decide how to do it" (FEAVER, 2003, p. 64) The mutual influence of information problems and divergent preferences generate two challenges: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection refers to the fact that the principal cannot be absolutely certain about the true preferences and skills of the agent, while moral hazard means that principals cannot always be present to observe the agent, so he/she can never be sure if the agent is following the orders or not. Briefly, Peter Feaver summarizes this point: "How do we know that the military is doing what it is supposed to be doing? How do we know that the military is serving the interests of the country and not parochial interests (…)?" (FEAVER, 2003, p.75) . These factors may increase agency losses, situations in which there is a conflict between the interests of those who delegate authority and the agent (KIEWIET; MCCUBBINS, 1991).
Monitoring mechanisms are tools for dealing with this problem of information: to
know what the agent is doing even though the principal cannot always be there to watch.
These mechanisms can be adjusted so that they are the least possibly intrusive or up until being a most intrusive way form of monitoring the military. Agents will behave depending on their expectations of punishment if they don't work or, more broadly speaking, simply according to their own preferences. Peter Feaver argues that the assumption of automatic punishment in case agents misbehave should be loosened when we are studying civilian and military authorities, since the issues at stake are more intricate. It does not seem realistic that civilians will systematically review the question of delegation each time a problem emerges (FEAVER, 2003, p. 58) . Bureaucratic inertia plays a role here, since costs of change are significant and tend to increase over time. Additionally, multidimensional preferences are at stake, so it is not a simple question of yes or no concerning whether to work or not.
Delegation depends on the trust in the military, according to Peter Feaver, but we should have in mind that in Latin America there's a general trend of over-delegation due, in part, to an absence of civilian expertise on defense matters and also due to historical patterns of high levels of autonomy given to the military institution. In a democracy, the assignment of a military mission should be initiated, managed and terminated by democratically elected leaders (PION-BERLIN, D.; ARCENEAUX, 2000), since civilians are the ones responsible for making political decisions. But in Latin America, the authors argue, the problem rests in the area of managing once the operation has started, since commonly civilians, due to the lack of expertise in counter-narcotic and counter-insurgency operations, "adopt a laissezfaire approach, refusing to make the kind of critical means-ends judgments necessary to keep the operation within permissible bounds." (PION-BERLIN, D; ARCENEAUX, 2000, p.
421). As a result, key decisions are often left to military commanders.
Returning to Peter Feaver framework, he says that monitoring can be done by simply limiting the scope of delegation to the military, leaving a greater amount of decisions and tasks to civilians. This can be achieved through rules of engagement, mission orders and contingency-plans. From elaborating strategy, defining operations, conceiving specific tactics and providing logistics and equipment, these are all tasks that should not necessarily be assigned to militaries.
A second form of monitoring, though more intrusive, is to introduce screening and selection mechanisms, meaning to inculcate civilian preferences among military members, decreasing the divergence between principal's preferences and agent's ones. Educational system and skill tests are means of selecting individuals fitting a certain pattern before an actual contractual relationship is formalized. Also, it includes accession policy in the armed forces and rules on officer promotions. Peter Feaver posits that civilian influence and screening over officer corps can help to increase the degree of confidence between the officers appointed and civilian authorities (2003, p. 79) .
The next more intrusive mechanism of monitoring is the use of the so-called "fire alarms", here third parties, such as the news media, think tanks and universities to oversee and report on key policy outcomes. "Fire alarms" have been previously defined by the literature as the observation by third parties that are affected by the agents' actions (KIEWIET, MCCUBBINS, 1991, p. 32-33) . This mechanism may be less costly and more reliable than the information collected by "police patrols". Indeed, under a well-coordinated system of fire-alarms, violations on the agents' conduct may be well scrutinized.
A fourth mechanism is the institutional checks that are directly empowered by the civilian principal to monitor other agents, having as primary mission to inform if there are any irregularities going on that disrespect the contractual mission (FEAVER, 2003, p. 81) .
In this category we can include the Congress civilian staff that are responsible for monitoring defense issues or budgets, a confirmable civilian secretariat and inter-service competition.
Institutional checks require that other agencies have the authority to block or to veto the actions of the agent; otherwise, they will be useless. Although institutional checks may increase the security of overcoming agency losses, they also may reduce flexibility in decisionmaking process (KIEWIET, MCCUBBINS, 1991, p. 24 (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) in the light of the monitoring mechanisms previously cited, a way of overcoming the problems that arise with delegation of power in a democracy.
THE BRAZILIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY (2007-2011)
The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is a key institution for consolidating democratic civilian control over the military (WINAND, SAINT-PIERRE, 2007; FUCILLE, 2006; BRUNEAU, 2001) . Not only are legal, financial and human resources necessary for this control, but the Ministry of Defense also needs to be effectively part of the political system. In both situations punishment mechanisms were employed to reinforce the discipline within the armed forces, since the relation between the military officers and civilian authorities had been negatively affected after the civilian aviation crisis begun. The first episode is clearly a variation of the third mechanism, a material disincentive impacting on a military career (an equivalent from dismissing an employee) while the second is not only a public purge (5 th set) but also an example of legal action.
After these punishment measures were taken, a second phase of Nelson Jobim's administration began, where several institutional aspects were reformed. A first step was to 12 Concerning this aspect, all ANAC and INFRAERO' directive boards were discharged.
publish the National Defense Strategy (2008) . This document was a considerable progress in comparison to the I National Defense Policy (Brazil, 1996) and the II National Defense Policy (Brazil, 2005) 
CONCLUSIONS
This article has analyzed how institutional measures taken to reinforce the authority of the Minister of Defense were based on a comprehension that delegation does not mean renouncing to authority. By creating a joint staff of the armed forces, changing the rules on military budget proposal and on promotion of military officers, connecting ministerial secretaries and helping to consolidate a civilian staff at the Ministry of Defense, these initiatives have reversed a historical pattern. That is, a high degree of autonomy of each service branch' commanders vis-à-vis the Minister.
Such measures can be classified conforming to the principal-agent framework as presenting different degrees of intrusiveness, from police patrol to rules on screening and selection. They also contribute to inculcate civilian values among military officers, thus helping to decrease the existing divergences between the principals' and the agents' preferences. However, there are still many obstacles to create a more connected network of fire alarms by third parties, whether it is the media news, think tanks or universities. The debate on defense issues is still restricted to a small group of experts and practitioners.
Additionally, the National Congress has also been quite distant from such debates and a stronger participation would be positive for advancing civil-military relations in Brazil.
Specialization and division of labor are ideas that have been present in political discourse in the time of implementing these changes. These measures have reinforced the idea that militaries are not involved with politics. The fact that intrusive monitoring mechanisms have been implemented in the Ministry of Defense, an institution that historically had problems in facing military political pressures is relevant. It also represents a strong test for democracy since it involved measures that affected military interests.
Maybe this could be the result of a gradual convergence between military and civilian preferences that now share a common understanding on how division of labor works in democracy. Also this can be a signal of a more professional military establishment, meaning
